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“He laughs best who laughs last.” 
—Sir John Vanbrugh (1664-1726) 
 
Often in the case of a marriage where one partner is a creative 
spouse, the primary marital asset is a body of copyrighted works.  
In 2013, author-spouses entered the period when they may begin to 
terminate any putative copyright transfer to the community 
property estate or terminate other transfers that may be the basis 
for prenuptial or postnuptial agreements, property settlements, or 
dissolution decrees in divorce actions.  Section 203 of the 1976 
Copyright Act provides that an author may unilaterally terminate a 
transfer of copyright approximately thirty-five years after the 
initial transfer.  In community property states, state law assumes 
that through the magic of the operation of state law, the author-
spouse transfers the copyright that federal law initially vests in the 
author to the community property (marital) estate.  This Article 
will analyze whether an author-spouse may terminate the transfer 
of copyright in the context of a domestic relationship.  It concludes 
that in the context of copyright termination, the domestic 
relationship, and state law, the author-spouse will always be able 
to nullify the carefully ordered state law presumptions for domestic 
relations and the possible ensuing dissolution of the marital union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2002 motion picture About A Boy, the protagonist Will 
Freeman, played by Hugh Grant, lives a life of self-indulgence 
living off the royalties of a hit song written by his deceased father.1  
This Article will shift the plot of About a Boy to focus on the rights 
of a spouse to income from a copyrighted work created during a 
marriage. In our hypothetical plot revision, the protagonist Will 
Freeman’s parents get divorced.  The sole or most valuable asset is 
still the copyright in the song.  The topic of this Article is: “What 
would be Freeman’s mother’s copyright interest in the song?”2  
Under the two cases that have addressed this issue in community 
property states, she would be entitled to at least one-half of the 
economic interests in the copyright, if not actually entitled to co-
ownership with both economic and management rights over the 
copyright.3
However, federal Copyright law adds a confounding variable 
to whatever rights state domestic relations law may grant to a 
spouse (or a divorced spouse).  Federal law provides that the 
author may terminate a transfer of a copyright approximately 
thirty-five years after the initial transfer.
  In the case of Freeman’s song, this would at first blush 
be at least a fair, if not generous, property settlement. 
4
                                                                                                             
1 Brian Warner, Is It Really Possible To Retire Off Royalties From One Hit Song?, 
Celebrity Net Worth (March 1, 2013), available at http://www.celebritynetworth.com
/articles/entertainment-articles/is-it-really-possible-to-retire-off-royalties-from-one-hit-
song.  This article also gives numerous examples of the revenues derived by a songwriter 
from a single song. 
  Although two courts 
have addressed the spouse’s rights to a property interest in a 
2 Actually, the question is more complicated.  In the movie, Freeman lives in London, 
England, so whatever rights the spouse may have would be governed by the United 
Kingdom’s copyright law for the works in the UK, and by United States law for works in 
the United States. See generally Patricia Scahill, Note and Comment, U.S. Copyright Law 
and Its Extraterritorial Application: Subafilms, Ltd v. GM-Pathe Communications, 19 
MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 293 (1995), available at http://digitalcommons.law.
umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1448&context=mjil. 
3 See infra Part I.A-B (In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987); Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
4 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012). 
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copyright,5 no court has yet addressed a spouse’s interest in 
preventing the author-spouse from exercising the copyright 
termination right.  There are at least two scenarios where an 
author-spouse may use his or her rights as an author in a manner 
that a divorced spouse (or domestic relations court) may find 
abusive.  First, an author-spouse could refuse to terminate an 
unrenumerative transfer of copyright in order to punish a spouse 
(by denying that spouse larger potential royalties in the future).  
Second, an author-spouse could end the divorced spouse’s 
economic or property interest in the copyright by terminating the 
community property transfer in a community property state or by 
terminating rights granted under prenuptial, antenuptial, settlement 
agreements, or court orders.  Surprisingly, the three major treatises 
on copyright law have yet to opine on this timely topic.6
As of 2013, the questions surrounding the exercise of 
termination of transfer rights under Copyright law are important 
because the 1976 Copyright Act provides that an author may 
terminate a grant of a transfer of the United States copyright right 
approximately thirty-five years after the initial transfer.
  
Therefore, this Article will attempt to lay the groundwork for 
further scholarship in this area. 
7  Authors 
have finally reached the window in which they may begin to 
exercise their termination of transfer rights.  Therefore, these 
disputes are becoming ripe for the purposes of judicial review.  
Although outside the domestic relations context, some current 
examples of the potential problems created by the termination of 
transfer rights involve iconic comic book characters: Superman, 
Spiderman, Iron Man, the Incredible Hulk, Thor, and the Fantastic 
Four.8
                                                                                                             
5 See In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135; Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 
432. 
  These are examples of iconic comic book characters that 
6 See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT (3d ed, 2005); MELVILLE 
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1989); WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY 
ON COPYRIGHT (2012). 
7 17 U.S.C. § 203(b); 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 25:74 (2012); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) (permitting the termination of rights in copyright extension 
terms). 
8 See Vincent James Scipor, Comment, The Amazing Spider-man: Trapped in the 
Tangled Web of the Termination Provisions, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 67, 68 n.1, 99 (2011). 
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are potentially worth billions of dollars to the heirs of their creators 
and will remain valuable into the foreseeable future.9  Termination 
of copyright transfers may also be a significant issue in the 
commercial software context.10  The dilemma of the modern 
software industry is that it came of age under a then-indeterminate 
brand new copyright regime, and now it faces the reality of the 
termination of copyright transfers on dates certain.  A little over a 
decade ago during the period of time leading up to the millennial 
“Y2K” crisis, the software industry and its clients learned to their 
mutual chagrin that modern computer programs were built on up to 
forty-year-old legacy backbones.11  Today, modern software may 
still contain thirty-five-year-old copyrighted code that is subject to 
the termination of transfer of the copyright grant.  Thus, in order to 
continue to use the software, the current proprietor may have to 
unravel and remove copyrighted legacy software routines at 
significant expense or to come to a new agreement with the current 
owner of the copyright termination right.12
                                                                                                             
9 See generally Mike Mintz, Top 5 Comic Book Lawsuits, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, 
(July 22, 2010), http://blog.martindale.com/top-5-comic-book-lawsuits-in-honor-of-
comic-con. 
 
10 Cf. Jon L. Phelps, Copyleft Termination: Will the Termination Provision of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 Undermine the Free Software Foundation’s General Public 
License?, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 261, 269–73 (2010) (discussing termination of copyright 
transfer in the FOSS context, but the legal principles apply with equal force to the 
commercial software industry).  Whether 17 U.S.C. § 117’s fair use provisions would be 
of significant assistance to the commercial entity whose copyright has been terminated is 
an open question. Id. at  269–73. 
11 See William Evan & Mark Manion, MINDING THE MACHINES: PREVENTING 
TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS 76 (2002) (measuring the cost of fixing Y2K at $400–$600 
billion).  Much of the Y2K fix consisted of patches to overcome problems relating to the 
date rather then the removal and creation of new software elements. Id. at 73–76. 
12 For example, much of the Internet and World Wide Web is dependent on software 
that is commonly considered to be in the public domain (or under global royalty free 
licenses) because the authors did not assert a copyright—perhaps for idealistic reasons, 
ignorance, or they did not realize the commercial value of what they created. See., e.g., 
NCSA Mosaic, GOVERNINGWITHCODE.ORG, http://www.governingwithcode.org/case_ 
studies/pdf/NCSAmosaic.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).  However, national laws in 
Berne Convention countries automatically granted the software author copyright 
protection—regardless of the desires or intent of the authors.  However, there may be 
laches, acquiescence, express or implied non-exclusive licenses available to current users 
as defenses so as to create a de facto quasi-public domain for current and historic uses of 
these works.  This is no longer true now that the author (or the author’s statutory heirs) 
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The problems facing the creative and commercial copyright 
industries are further compounded in light of the unsettled state of 
Copyright law immediately after the enactment of the 1976 
Copyright Act.13  While many followers of the software industry 
remember the 1990s as their golden years, many important 
software giants were founded in the 1970s—shortly before or after 
the 1976 Copyright Act was passed into law.14  The 1970s and 
1980s saw the founding of major software or Internet companies, 
for example: Foxconn (1974), Microsoft (1975), Apple (1976), 
3COM (1979), Oracle (1979), Logitech (1981), Compaq (1982), 
Electronic Arts (1982), Adobe (1982), etc.15  Among the 
commercially significant copyright issues that were debated during 
this period were the appropriate standard for determining a work-
for-hire,16 and whether computer software was copyrightable 
subject matter.17
                                                                                                             
have a termination of copyright transfer right, these rights may be recaptured.  Equitable 
defenses to copyright infringement may not be available.  Courts sitting in equity will 
probably hold that if statutorily an author can terminate a positive grant of a transfer of 
copyright despite any express agreement to the contrary then the prudential principles 
behind equitable defenses suggest that equitable defenses should also yield to statutory 
Copyright law. Cf. Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Const. Toys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 75, 90–92 
(D. Conn. 2012) (equitable doctrine of laches does not trump statute of limitations). 
  Although in 1980, Congress amended the 1976 
Copyright Act in response to the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) report to 
“make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they 
embody an author’s original creation, are proper subject matter for 
copyright” and “to ensure that rightful possessors of copies of 
13 See, e.g., Dale P. Olson, Copyright and Fair Use: Implications of Nation Enterprises 
for Higher Education, 12 J.C. & U.L. 489, 497 (1986) (originality); James B. Wadley & 
JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, Work-For-
Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 428–29 (1999) 
(teacher exception); Vivian F. Wang, Sale Or License? UMG v. Augusto, Vernor v. 
Autodesk, And The First Sale Doctrine, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2010). 
14 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 459 n.3 
(1983). 
15 Computer History for 1960 - 1980, COMPUTER HOPE, http://www.computerhope
.com/history/196080.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
16 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 n.2, 738–39 
(1989). 
17 See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1241–42 (3rd 
Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). 
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computer programs may use or adapt these copies for their use.”18  
The scope of copyright protection in a computer program 
continued to be hotly contested over subsequent years.19  Also, the 
legal question regarding the definition of employee for the 
purposes of creating a work-for-hire is important because if a 
copyrighted work is a work-for-hire, then the copyright vests in the 
employer, and there is no termination of transfer right.20  The 
definition of employee for the purposes of determining whether 
copyrighted work was a work-for-hire was not authoritatively 
resolved until 1989, eleven years after the effective date of the 
1976 Copyright Act.21  So for a critical period of eleven years in 
the evolution of the Internet and the maturation of the software 
industry, copyright law was unclear.  There were four competing 
definitions of employee used in different circuits.  Curiously, the 
Ninth Circuit, the home of much of the software industry, did not 
opine on the work-for-hire definition of employee until 1989 and 
then it erroneously held that only formal salaried employees are 
employees under the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 
Copyright Act.22  So, the Ninth Circuit, as well as the rest of the 
United States, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit and D.C. 
Circuit (whose interpretation eventually prevailed), was at best 
indeterminate or affirmatively wrong.23  Consequently, it would be 
unsurprising to find that some commercial software entities tied 
their intellectual property rights in software on uncertain legal 
moorings based on the circuit law then in effect.24
                                                                                                             
18 Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d at 1241 (quoting National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 1, (1978)). 
 
19 See, e.g., Computer Assocs., Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Lotus Dev. 
Corp. v. Paperback Software Intern., 740 F.Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). 
20 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1490 n.7 (1988). 
21 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. at 736 n.2, 738–39 
(describing four different tests used by the regional circuit courts to determine whether a 
work is a work-made-for-hire under the 1976 Copyright Act). 
22 See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989), rejected by Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8 (1989). 
23 See Cmty. for Creative-Non Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739. 
24 See, e.g., Ian DeBernardo, Updates in Science and Technology Law – Software, 1 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 11, 41 (1995) (assuming the Altai decision “will undoubtedly 
cause software companies to reevaluate their use of copyright protection”); Jack M. 
Haynes, Computer Software: Intellectual Property Protection in the United States and 
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That assumes that the legal niceties of Copyright law were 
never seriously considered in the early days of the software 
industry or in the entertainment industry.  Even by the early 1990s 
after the courts established the essential contours of the 1976 
Copyright Act, the lackadaisical attitudes of software and 
entertainment companies towards copyright niceties arguably 
continued to persist well into this most recent 35-year period.25
Cohen suggests that section 204’s writing 
requirement does not apply to this situation, 
advancing an argument that might be summarized, 
tongue in cheek, as: Moviemakers do lunch, not 
contracts.  Cohen concedes that “[i]n the best of all 
possible legal worlds” parties would obey the 
writing requirement, but contends that moviemakers 
are too absorbed in developing “joint creative 
endeavors” to “focus upon the legal niceties of 
copyright licenses.”
  
This attitude is typified in Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen where 
the Ninth Circuit noted: 
26
Consequently, the current creative content industries, and 
especially those companies with a significant dependency on 
legacy software or immediate post-1976 Copyright Act works, 
may be surviving on the inertia of the author, non-exclusive 
licenses granted through conduct, and possible infringement claims 
that may be barred by the statute of limitations or equitable 
doctrines such as laches, or acquiescence.  The ability to terminate 
the transfer of an interest in copyright may motivate authors to 
recapture lost value and for those already so motivated, free them 
from any equitable defenses to copyright infringement that may 
have developed over the passing decades.  Companies and business 
models that are based on doubtful legal rights to use copyrighted 
 
                                                                                                             
Japan, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 245, 257 (1995) (recognizing that 
contemporary software vendors are advised to protect their software by utilizing a multi-
tiered strategy involving copyright coupled with licensing and trade secrets). 
25 See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990); Rouse v. 
Walter & Assocs., L.L.C., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1055–56 (S.D. Iowa 2007); BPI Sys., 
Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 211 (W.D. Tex. 1981). 
26 Effects Assocs. Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d at 556–57. 
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works may be cast into chaos if the current possessors of the right 
to terminate copyright transfers elect to exercise them. 
This Article will review the two cases involving post-
dissolution ownership of a copyright to works created during the 
marriage to set the stage for its analysis of whether, under 
Copyright law, an author-spouse may terminate the putative 
transfer to the community property estate by operation of state 
law.27  The Article will then consider whether an author may 
terminate a transfer by voluntary agreement in a prenuptial, ante-
nuptial, or settlement agreement, or terminate a transfer that takes 
place involuntarily through a court order.28  Under § 203(a) of the 
Copyright Act, transfers by operation of state law or through 
voluntary contract-like agreements should be terminable by the 
author spouse or the author-spouse’s statutory heirs.  However, 
state courts may attempt to frustrate an author’s (or statutory 
heirs’) attempt to terminate a copyright transfer through their 
contempt-of-court powers, but such contempt orders should be 
preempted by federal law.  Accordingly, whatever plans laid by 
mice, men, or the states, the author-spouse will always enjoy the 
last laugh and the right to terminate the copyright transfer. If this is 
not the copyright policy result that Congress sought to achieve then 
Congress must change the default rules. By either enacting a new 
Copyright law so that it expressly grants greater deference to state 
law or state courts in domestic relations matters or by creating an 
independent federal balance of copyright interests expressly 
weighing domestic relations and state family law interests in an 
author’s exercise termination of copyright, Congress may fulfill its 
constitutional duty to promote the “Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts”29
                                                                                                             
27 See infra Part I.A-B. 
 and the public policy goals of respecting the states’ 
domestic relations law and their obligation to regulate domestic 
relations law. 
28 See infra Part II. 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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I. COPYRIGHT AS A COMMUNITY OR MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHT 
First, it is not clear that an interest in a federally granted 
copyright should be transferable through the operation of state 
law.30  In two highly contentious divorce cases in community 
property states, courts have found that, through operation of state 
law, the copyrights to works created during marriage vested in the 
marital estate in the form of community property and were subject 
to division upon dissolution of the marriage.31  The intersection of 
copyright and state domestic relations law is further confounded by 
the status of termination rights in copyrighted works in equitable 
distribution states and the unclear answers to the copyright-
property questions presented by peripatetic married couples that 
accumulate quasi-community property that must also be 
considered in the course of a dissolution proceeding.32
In recent years, all state courts [including those in 
equitable distribution jurisdictions] that have 
addressed the issue have either assumed or 
explicitly held that copyrights, and the royalties 
therefrom, are marital (or community) property to 
the extent that the copyrighted work or profits 
therefrom were generated by spousal labor during 
marriage[.] 
  However, 
as noted by one commentator: 
33
                                                                                                             
30 See Alice Haemmerli, Take It, It’s Mine: Illicit Transfers of Copyright by Operation 
of Law, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1043–44 (2006); Scott M. Martin & Peter W. 
Smith, The Unconstitutionality of State Motion Picture Film Lien Laws (or How Spike 
Lee Almost Lost It), 39 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 91–92 (1989); see also 3-10 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.04 (1989) (“By its terms Section 
201(e) is not limited to acts by governmental bodies and officials. It includes acts of 
seizure, etc., by any ‘organization’ as well. It is, moreover, not limited to such acts by 
foreign governments, officials, and organizations.”); 2 PATRY, supra note 
 
7, § 4:76 (“Any 
involuntary transfer should be void under the plain language of section 201(e) . . . .”). 
31 In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Rodrigue v. 
Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 218 F.3d 432 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
32 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Love’s Labor’s Lost: Marry for Love, Copyright 
Work Made-For-Hire, and Alienate at Your Leisure, 101 KY. L.J. 113, 134–35 (2012-
2013). 
33 2 MATTHEW BENDER & CO., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 
§23.07 (1998). 
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These judicial holdings are highly contested in the law review 
literature;34 but generally, leading copyright commentators accept 
these cases as articulating the correct federal law of copyright.35
In re Marriage of Worth and Rodrigue v. Rodrigue are the two 
leading, and possibly only, cases under the 1976 Copyright Act 
involving a dispute between spouses over the ownership of a 
copyright in a community property jurisdiction. These cases are 
not especially instructive as to the legal mechanics, procedures, or 
processes by which copyright transfer takes place; nor do they 
address the point in time of the initial transfer of copyright—other 
than to find that by operation of state law that a transfer did take 
place at some point during the marital relationship. Each case 
reached a similar result.  However, each case arrived at its result 
through a different theory or process of state law.
 
36
A. In re Marriage of Worth 
  These cases 
are useful only in that both cases found that a process of state law 
transferred some right associated with the author’s copyright from 
the author which transformed it to community property, and that 
they serve as a convenient starting point to determine when the 
initial transfer of copyright takes place in a community property 
state. 
In re Marriage of Worth presented the first opportunity for 
either a state or federal court to opine on the ownership of a 
copyright, under the 1976 Copyright Act, of a work created during 
                                                                                                             
34 See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, How Copyrights Became Community Property (Sort of): 
Through the Rodrigue v. Rodrigue Looking Glass, 47 LOY. L. REV. 631, 632 (2001) 
(describing the court as “constructing a curious new regime[,]” which was a resolution 
that neither party argued in the briefs before the court of appeals); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., 
To Split or Not to Split: Judicial Divisibility of the Copyright Interests of Authors and 
Others, 40 FAM. L.Q. 499, 517 (2006) (depicting the Rodrigue appeals court as “boldly 
innovative and diabolically clever[]”). 
35 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 5.1 (3d ed. 2005); NIMMER, 
supra note 30, § 6A.03; 2 PATRY, supra note 7, § 5:116. 
36 Compare Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 318 F.3d 432, 435 with Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 
138 (the court in Marriage of Worth considered a copyright created during a marriage as 
a divisible community asset while the court in Rodrigue reasoned that the economic 
benefits of the copyrighted work, as opposed to the copyright itself, belong to the 
community). 
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the marriage in a community property state (California).37  Prior to 
the decision in Worth, the parties had already agreed to allocate 
their respective interests in the royalties resulting from the 
copyrighted works created during the marriage.38  The author-
spouse then commenced a copyright infringement action against 
the producers of the “Trivial Pursuit” board game.39  The divorced-
spouse sought an order for one-half of the proceeds, if any, from 
the copyright infringement action.40  The Worth court had to 
reconcile California’s community property law principle that all 
property acquired during a marriage is community property with § 
201(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act’s provision “vesting initial” 
ownership of the copyright in the individual author(s).41  
California’s community property law assumes a partnership model 
and that each spouse makes an equal contribution to the marriage 
and shares equally in the wealth accumulated during marriage.42  
Copyright law on the other hand reflects constitutional and 
statutory policy determinations that if authors are granted a limited 
period of exclusivity to exploit the market for the copyrighted 
work, this economic incentive will promote the “Progress of Arts 
and Sciences” by encouraging authors to be more productive and 
to disseminate their works to the public.43
                                                                                                             
37 Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136–37. California has a sui generis statutory law of 
community property. See WILLIAM BASSETT, BASSETT ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY LAW § 1:4 (2011 ed.). 
  Without affirmative 
action by Congress, the federal goals of encouraging authors and 
the state goals of stability and harmony in family life, while not 
necessarily inconsistent, may in fact be irreconcilable. 
38 Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136. 
39 Id. at 135. 
40 See Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987); Worth, 241 Cal. 
Rptr. at 135 n.1. 
41 Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr at 136–37. 
42 Id. at 136. 
43 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(the limited monopoly conferred by the Copyright Act “is intended to motivate creative 
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control 
has expired”); see also New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 519–20 (2001) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
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First, the Worth court considered the “vests initially” provision 
of § 201(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act in conjunction with § 
201(d)(1), which provides that copyright ownership may transfer 
by operation of (California) state law.44  The Worth court 
concluded that California’s community property laws 
simultaneously with the federal 1976 Copyright Act vesting the 
author-spouse with the copyright transferred a legal interest in that 
copyright to the non-author spouse in the form of community 
property.45  Having concluded that federal copyright law permitted 
the transfer of a copyright by operation of state law from the author 
to the community property estate, the Worth court then had to 
consider whether a copyright was the type of property that could 
be assigned through California state community property law.46
California law excludes some intangible assets such as a 
professional license in allocating community property; because, 
community property only exists prior to the dissolution of the 
marriage.
 
47  The Worth court distinguished a professional license 
to practice law, medicine, or a skilled-trade acquired during 
marriage from a copyright to a work created during the marriage 
by holding that “[a] copyright has a present value based upon the 
ascertainable value of the underlying artistic work. Its value 
normally would not depend on the [post-marital] efforts of the 
authoring spouse but rather on the tangible benefits directly or 
indirectly associated with the literary product.”48  As a matter of 
common sense, ordinary experience and the facts in the Worth case 
themselves demonstrate that this conclusion regarding the future 
value of a copyright not depending on the efforts of the author-
spouse is clearly wrong.49
                                                                                                             
44 See Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136–38. 
  However, the Worth court succinctly 
45 See id. at 139; see also Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 n.2 (E.D. La 
1999) (“The only reported case [Worth] on this subject concluded, with little analysis, 
that the Copyright Act does not preempt community property law.”). 
46 Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 For example, in Worth, at dispute was a share of the damages as a result of a 
copyright infringement action.  This damage award would be a clear result of the post-
dissolution efforts of the author-spouse. Id.; see also Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 51 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (involving a dispute over the profits resulting from 
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found that the copyright had been transferred to the community 
property estate, and it halved all incidents of the copyright without 
adequately considering whether federal copyrights are a sui generis 
species of claims to economic revenues separate from the 
management rights.  The court also failed to consider whether 
copyright interests were susceptible to judicial cleavage without 
damaging the delicate policy balance struck by Congress weighing 
the author’s incentive to create and disseminate works against the 
public’s need for access and use of copyrighted works through 
clear property rights in the work. 
B. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue 
In Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, the federal courts interpreted 
copyright ownership for the first time in the context of a state 
domestic relations dispute.50  The district court in Rodrigue was 
unable to harmonize the conflict between state community 
property law and federal law and held that federal law preempted 
Louisiana’s state community property law purporting to transfer 
the copyright from the author-spouse.51  However, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit claimed to achieve 
some measure of harmonization between state and federal law; and 
it found that there was no federal preemption of Louisiana state 
community property law.52  On appeal, the Rodrigue court 
interpreted the text of § 201(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act to only 
convey the exclusive right to the § 106 copyright “rights” to the 
author without vesting the corresponding economic rights in the 
author.53
                                                                                                             
21 years of post-dissolution efforts by the author-spouse to revive Star Trek and 
ultimately to create the Start Trek franchise). 
  Under this strained interpretation, only the 1976 
Copyright Act’s § 106 enumeration of exclusive rights of 
50 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue (Rodrigue I), 55 F. Supp 2d 534, 540–46 (E.D. La. 1999) 
(finding federal preemption of Louisiana community property law), rev’d on other 
grounds, 218 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2000) (straining to construe Louisiana community 
property law as consistent with the Copyright Act). 
51 Rodrigue v. Rodrigue (Rodrigue II), 218 F.3d at 547. 
52 Id. at 435. 
53 Id. at 435–36.  These property law principles may be sui generis to Louisiana as a 
civil code jurisdiction and severely limit Rodrigue II as persuasive authority in the Fifth 
Circuit much less nationally. See also Nivens, supra note 34, at 517–18. 
2013] INTERSPOUSAL TERMINATION RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT 109 
reproduction, adaptation, publication, public performance, and 
public display were initially vested in the author.54  The Rodrigue 
court then carefully noted that § 106 does not use the term “owner” 
or “ownership” nor does it refer to the concomitant economic 
rights of copyright ownership.55  Although citing Worth on the 
issue of the copyright right vesting in the author, the Rodrigue 
court then departed from the Worth court in its legal analysis and 
found that the author-spouse was the sole author and the other 
spouse was not a co-author under Copyright law.56
The Rodrigue court avoided the thorny practical issue of title 
and co-ownership created by the Worth court by recognizing that 
Congress vested title in the author-spouse.
 
57  The Rodrigue court 
then sua sponte used principles of Louisiana property law and 
divided the author’s copyright into functional property rights such 
as the “(1) usus-the right to use or possess,” “(2) abusus-the right 
to abuse or alienate,” and “(3) fructus-the right to the fruits.”58  
Under this novel interpretation of Louisiana state law, the author-
spouse individually owned the legal rights associated with the usus 
and abusus of the copyright while the economic rights associated 
with the fructus of the copyright were either owned jointly-by-the-
spouses or jointly-owned through the marital estate by operation of 
Louisiana state domestic relations law.59  This novel division of 
personal intangible property rights did not clearly map a Copyright 
law, common law, or even a civil law understanding of property 
law.60
These two cases, although buttressed by the endorsement 
authors of well-known treatises, have been the subject of stinging 
academic commentary, and therefore, may not be a solid 
 
                                                                                                             
54 Rodrigue II, 218 F.3d at 435–36. 
55 Id.; see also Quality King Distr., Inc. v. L’anza Research Intern., Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 
141 (1998) (limiting copyright owners exclusive rights); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432–33 (1984) (providing that a copyright owner’s 
rights are not absolute). 
56 Rodrigue II, 218 F.3d at 438 n.26; see also id. at 436 n.16. 
57 Id. at 441. 
58 Id. at 436–37; see Ciolino, supra note 34, at 632. 
59 Rodrigue II, 218 F.3d at 437; see Ciolino, supra note 34, at 647. 
60 See generally Ciolino, supra note 34 (detailing an unworkable regime of 
dismembered copyright ownership). 
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foundation on which to presume either that federal law does not 
preempt a transfer of copyright by operation of state law or that 
other states would permit under state law a transfer of a 
copyright.61
II. TERMINATION OF TRANSFER RIGHTS 
  However, assuming that the two courts deciding the 
issue of ownership to the copyright of a work created during the 
marriage in a community property state are correct, then there is 
still an unresolved issue as to when the transfer takes place; the 
author-spouse’s post-dissolution right to terminate under copyright 
law the copyright transfer to the marital estate; or to terminate 
copyright transfers created in prenuptial, postnuptial, settlement 
agreements, or even those established by court decrees. 
The termination of transfer of a copyright must place during a 
window of time approximately thirty-five years after the initial 
transfer.62
Some courts and scholars consider a transfer of ownership of a 
copyright in a community property state to the marital community 
to be a transfer by operation of law.
  There are at least three possible points at which a 
copyright may be initially transferred in the marital context—
automatic transfer by law, by a court order or judgment, or by 
voluntary agreement by the author as part of a prenuptial, 
postnuptial agreement, or as part of a voluntary property settlement 
at the time of dissolution. 
63  Accordingly, one must 
examine state law to determine when the transfer takes place.64
                                                                                                             
61 See, e.g., J. Wesley Cochran, It Takes Two to Tango!: Problems With Community 
Property Ownership of Copyrights and Patents in Texas, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 407, 441–
45 (2006); Debora Polacheck, The ‘Un-Worth-y’ Decision: The Characterization of a 
Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601, 616–20 (1995). 
  In 
62 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012). 
63 There are three ways to obtain a transfer of copyright ownership: through a writing; 
by operation of state law; or through bankruptcy proceedings.  Here, absent a writing, the 
transfer must be through operation of state law. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Worth, 241 
Cal. Rptr. 135, 139 (1987). 
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012) (“Termination of the grant may be effected at any 
time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date 
of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the 
period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work 
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the context of community property law, it is not clear when the 
transfer originally took place.  If under state law the non-author 
spouse accrued an “operation by law transfer” upon the creation of 
a work during marriage, then that would start the thirty-five year 
period.65  However, if the transfer does not take place until the 
entry of the court order allocating the spouse’s interest in the 
copyright, then that would be the starting point to determine when 
the thirty-five year period commenced.66  When the clock starts is 
critical because it determines the start of the period during which 
the non-author spouse has rights in the copyright—assuming that 
the author-spouse could terminate an intra-spousal transfer under 
federal law.  If the transfer takes place upon the creation of the 
work, the transfer rights to a work done in the first year of a thirty-
five year marriage may be terminable with at least two years’ 
notice.67  While if state law transferred the copyrights upon 
dissolution of the marriage, the non-author spouse would enjoy at 
least thirty-five years of post-dissolution benefits resulting from a 
work that was created at any point during the marriage.68  
However, if the transfer takes place when the work was created 
during the marriage, the non-author spouse in theory may receive a 
period substantially less than 35 years—in fact as few as two 
years.69
                                                                                                             
under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, 
whichever term ends earlier.”). 
  The author-spouse’s (or the author’s statutory heirs’) 
ability to exercise termination of transfer rights with at least two, 
but no more than ten, years’ notice, places the non-author-spouse 
in a precarious economic position vis-à-vis the author spouse, 
especially if the only significant assets are “old” copyrighted 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. § 203(3)–(4)(A) 
68 The author uses the term “benefits” advisedly because other than a consensus that 
the non-author-spouse has some claim on the copyright by operation of state domestic 
relations law, the scope of that claim is unclear. See supra Part I.A–B. 
69 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(A)(4)(a) (“The notice shall state the effective date of the 
termination, which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this 
subsection, and the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before 
that date.”). 
112 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:95 
works, such as the hypothetical involving the song in About a Boy, 
created during marriage.70
A. The Termination of Transfer Rights Clock Starts: At Creation    
  
 
 Probably the better interpretation of when the transfer occurs 
under community property law is that in a community property 
state, the transfer to the community takes place upon the fixation of 
the copyrighted work during marriage.71  Copyright law clearly 
provides that the copyright subsists upon fixation,72
Community property is defined nearly uniformly in 
all community property states. A typical definition 
is: ‘property acquired after marriage by either the 
husband, the wife, or both.’  All property acquired 
during the marriage is presumed to be community 
property.  The presumption is not generally 
overcome by the fact that record title to the property 
is in the name of one spouse alone. Mere 
expectancies and other interests which do not 
 and general 
principles of state community property law provide that 
                                                                                                             
70 See Warner, supra note 1. 
71 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining the term “fixed”); cf. 17 U.S.C. 302(c) (the copyright 
in a work made for hire expires 120 years after creation).  The author is aware of only 
one other area of law where there is a similar automatic transfer of property rights and 
that example takes place upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. 
§541(a).  It is clear that copyrights are transferred to the bankruptcy estate. See U.S. v. 
Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir.  1991).  Further, this transfer is more than a 
mere equitable fiction for the administrative convenience of administering the bankruptcy 
estate. See Bromley v. Fleet Bank, 659 N.Y.S.2d 83, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).  “The 
trustee of the estate of the bankrupt is vested with title to all of the bankrupt’s property as 
of the date of the filing of the petition, including rights and choses in action existing at 
that time.” Id.  Arguendo, if the bankruptcy estate acquires its interest in the copyright 
directly from the author that starts the period from which the termination of transfer 
rights occurs rather than a the point where the bankruptcy estate granted the copyrights to 
the new owner or licensee unless there is some principle in bankruptcy law that permits 
the tolling of the period of time a depreciable asset spends in the bankruptcy estate. 
72 See New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 493 (2001). 
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constitute “property” cannot constitute community 
property.73
So, because the property right in the copyright vests 
immediately upon fixation, the legal rights, if any, are immediately 
transferred to the marital estate.
 
74
This understanding of community property is consistent with 
the court’s holding in Worth.  The Worth court noted: 
 
Moreover, the Act expressly provides for the 
transfer of a copyright by contract, will “or by 
operation of law” (§ 201(d)(1)).  Consequently, 
notwithstanding that the copyright “vests initially” 
in the authoring spouse (§ 201(a)), the copyright is 
automatically transferred to both spouses by 
operation of the California law of community 
property.75
Accordingly, the copyright transfer by operation of California’s 
community property law took place automatically upon the 
fixation of the work; because, under Copyright law, fixation is the 
point of time at which the author first obtained a federally 
recognized copyright interest in the work by operation of the 1976 
Copyright Act.
 
76
This simultaneous transfer of property rule appears to be black 
letter law in other community property jurisdictions.
 
77
                                                                                                             
73 Gerald B. Treacy, 802-2nd T.M. (BNA), Community Property: General 
Considerations at II.D.2. 
 
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
75 Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (emphasis added). 
76 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright 
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 398–99 
(2010); see also J.T. WESTERMEIER, LEE J. PLAVE & JAMES J. HALPERT, DOCUMENTING E-
COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS § 1:11 (“Since copyright rights vest automatically in the 
author by operation of law from the moment of creation and fixation in tangible media, 
the author of the materials has a copyright in and to the materials without regard to 
whether copyright rights were sought and irrespective of whether the materials include a 
copyright notice.”). 
77 See Salenius v. Salenius, 654 A.2d 426, 429 (Me. 1995); Drake v. Drake, 725 A.2d 
717, 721 n.5 (Pa. 1999); Hursey v. Hursey, 326 S.E.2d 178, 181 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); cf. 
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The basic concept of community property is easily 
expressed: all property acquired by the spouses 
during the marriage belongs not to either spouse 
individually but to a third entity, the marital 
community.  Because legal title to community 
property lies with the community and not with 
either spouse individually, community’s ownership 
interest is not a mere future expectancy which vests 
upon divorce; it is an immediate and real legal title 
interest.  Thus, classification of an asset as 
community property has important consequences 
during the marriage for both the parties and their 
creditors.  When the community is dissolved by 
either divorce or death, property owned by the 
community is divided between the parties.78
In fact, this automatic transfer of property rights by state law of 
property acquired during the marriage is one of the salient 
differences between a community property jurisdiction and an 
equitable distribution system also known as a common system or 
title system.
 
79  In the community property state, the marital estate 
holds all marital property jointly.80  In an equitable distribution 
state, legal title may remain in the name of each spouse, and at the 
time of marital dissolution, the court then allocates property rights 
under some equitable scheme.81
                                                                                                             
UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4(b), 9A U.LA. 141 (1983) (“All property of spouses is 
presumed to be marital property.”). 
  So, in an equitable distribution 
state, if there was going to be a transfer of a copyright by operation 
of law, it would be done by the court only as part of allocating the 
property rights of the marital partners at the time of marital 
dissolution. 
78 BRETT R. TURNER, 1 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 2:5 (3d ed. 2005). 
79 Drake, 725 A.2d at 721 n.4. 
80 See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code §§ 2550–56 (West 2004). 
81 See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/504 (West 2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 
46b81, 46b-82 (West 2012) 
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1. The Trophy Spouse Dilemma 
Under the court’s holding in Worth, the copyright transfer takes 
place by operation of state law immediately upon creation and 
fixation.82  This could lead to a ludicrous result in community 
property states.83
This holds true unless the Worth court is correct that works 
created during marriage are actually joint works under the 1976 
Copyright Act.
  For example, a long suffering spouse of many 
years finds that the transfer of the copyrighted work to the marital 
estate may be terminated before, upon, or after the divorce so that 
the brand new trophy spouse may enjoy the fruits of the copyright 
for many years to come.  While this interpretation of the 1976 
Copyright Act may have unfortunate consequences for the spouse 
during the creation of the work, it is a more principled 
interpretation of the Act.  The alternative interpretation is to 
assume the copyright exists in the ether of state community 
property law to be characterized and transferred only when the 
marital parties agree in writing or a court so orders and that 
order—possibly many years after the creation of the work—
constitutes a transfer under § 203(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.  
The court order would then be the act constituting the transfer by 
operation of law, for the purposes of determining the start of the 
statutory period that commences the measure of time for the 
exercise of the author spouse’s termination of transfer rights. 
84
                                                                                                             
82 See In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
  There is scant support for this proposition.  The 
Worth court assumed without any analysis that both California law 
and the 1976 Copyright Act by operation of state law, under the 
provisions addressing transfer of a copyright, could make a spouse 
a joint-author.  This holding in Worth presents one more copyright 
conundrum.  The 1976 Copyright Act contains a statutory 
definition of joint work that is inconsistent with California law as 
interpreted by the court in Worth.  The Act defines a “joint work” 
as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that 
83 The author assumes solely for the purposes of this example (as do the states as a 
matter of state domestic relations policy) that as a matter of copyright policy the non-
author spouse at the time the work was created has a greater claim on the economic fruits 
of the copyright than does a post-fixation claim of the new(er) spouse. 
84 Of course, the Worth court could have just written the opinion inartfully. 
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their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.”85  The Worth court created a legal fiction 
under state law that the divorced spouse was a co-author or the 
author of a joint work.  However, under the 1976 Copyright Act, 
there are specific statutory provisions for the authors of joint-
works to exercise their collective termination of transfer rights.86  
More importantly, one joint-author cannot terminate the copyright 
ownership rights of another joint-author.87 Assuming that the 
holding in Worth is correct in its interpretation of the 1976 
Copyright Act, then it presciently, fortuitously, or serendipitously, 
solved the vexing dilemma that is the focus of this article.  
Unluckily, while § 201(d)(1) of the Act permits the transfer of any 
of an author’s copyright rights, § 201(d)(1) limits this to the 
author’s exclusive rights under § 106.88
However, if the answer is not found in state law, then one must 
examine the 1976 Copyright Act for an answer.  To determine 
whether someone is a joint-author, absent an express written 
agreement, courts look to the conduct of the putative joint-authors 
to find intent, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming to 
be a co-author.
  Section 201(d)(1) does 
not appear to include granting a state or state court, through the 
operation of the state, the right to reject the statutory definition of a 
joint-work and to create new forms of authorship. 
89  Absent a presumption that living in a community 
property state is evidence of intent to make a spouse a co-author, 
many, if not all, non-author spouses will be unable to carry this 
burden by demonstrating an objective manifestation that the two 
individuals (a married couple) intended to create a joint-work.  The 
courts often focus on the question of the dominant author’s intent 
to create a joint-work, in this case, the author-spouse.90
                                                                                                             
85 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
  The case 
law is consistent that each putative author must make an 
86 See id. § 203(a)(1); HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 12:21 (2012). 
87 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]ermination of the grant may be effected by a 
majority of the authors who executed it”). 
88 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (referencing § 106’s listing of 
exclusive rights in a copyright to reproduce, create derivative works, distribute, perform 
and display the work). 
89 See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200–02 (2d Cir. 1998). 
90 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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independently copyrightable contribution to the joint work.91  
Often, the non-author spouse’s assistance to the author-spouse is 
rejected as adequate evidence of joint-authorship by the courts, for 
example, if they provide assistance in editing or research 
assistance, even if these contributions may have been 
independently copyrightable.92
2. The Liar Paradox Dilemma 
  So, most spouses, absent some 
evidence of a creative collaboration, are unlikely to meet the 
statutory definition of the author of a joint-work.  Consequently, 
even if California community property law does view each spouse 
as a joint-author, the federal termination of transfer right will 
belong only to the spouse who is considered the author under the 
1976 Copyright Act. 
The Liar Paradox is a statement that contains an inherent 
contradiction, for example, “this sentence is false.”93  The 
intersection of the federal termination of copyright rights and state 
community property law results in an inherent contradiction, or is 
at least analogous to the metaphor of a dog chasing its own tail.  
The following example demonstrates the silliness of state domestic 
relations law in this area, especially in a community property state.  
If the parties are still married and under federal law the author-
spouse effected a termination of the copyright transfer to the 
community property estate, the copyright is then automatically and 
simultaneously re-vested in the community property estate by 
operation of state law. Once the property right returns to the author 
spouse, state law automatically vests an interest in that right in the 
community.94  This would lead to an absurd result.95
                                                                                                             
91 See, e.g., Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 
362 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 992 (2010); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 
1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).  But see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–61 (7th 
Cir.  2004); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d at 506 (noting a split among the leading 
commentators and copyright treatises). 
  This would 
92 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d at 507. 
93 See Stuart Banner, Please Don’t Read the Title, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 245 n.9 (1989) 
(detailing the history of the Liar Paradox from ancient times to modern philosophy). 
94 This example may fail solely because copyright law requires any initial transfer 
from the author to be voluntary, and there is an assumption that the act of marriage makes 
an operation of law community property transfer a voluntary transfer.  In this 
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completely frustrate Congress’s stated public policy goal behind 
the termination of transfer right—the right of “safeguarding 
authors against unremunerative transfers . . . because of the 
unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the 
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been 
exploited.”96  Any interpretation of state domestic-relations law 
that returns the terminated copyright transfer to the marital estate 
raises serious questions of federal preemption.  Congress vested in 
the author the absolute right to terminate that transfer of the 
copyright, and state law effectively, at least during the marriage in 
a community property state, precludes the author from terminating 
an operation-of-law transfer to the marital community by 
automatically retransferring the terminated right independently of 
the author’s intent to the marital community.  Such a law would 
render federal law nugatory.97
As with the Liar Paradox, there are elegant solutions to the 
inherent contradictions.  Another reading of the 1976 Copyright 
Act may accomplish Congress’s intent to protect authors.  Section 
201(e) of the Act permits the voluntary transfer of copyright to the 
marital community in a community property state.
 
98
                                                                                                             
hypothetical, even the most fervent proponents of marriage as the voluntary act to support 
a transfer, would find it difficult to find this operation of law transfer a voluntary act.  
One could also argue that the voluntary scope of 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) would not apply to a 
subsequent transfer of a terminated right since the language of the statute uses the phrase 
“has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author.”  These are 
interesting issues outside the scope of this Article.  But, it would seem that any 
involuntary transfer of a terminated copyright would severely weaken the termination 
right and be inconsistent with Congress’ grant of the right which was to replace the new 
copyright estate granted during the renewal period under the Copyright Act of 1909. 
  However, the 
penumbras of the termination right under § 203 of the 1976 
Copyright Act do not permit an involuntary transfer of a copyright 
95 See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004) (“Court will not 
construe a statute in a manner that leads to absurd or futile results.”). 
96 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740, 
1976 WL 14045. 
97 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 138 (2004) (“Court will not construe a 
statute in a manner that leads to absurd or futile results.”); see also Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“state law is naturally preempted to 
the extent of any conflict with a federal statute”). 
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e); infra Part III.B. 
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by operation of state law to revert the terminated copyright to the 
marital estate.  While this would give effect to Congress’s purpose 
behind § 203, the protection of authors from bad copyright deals,99 
nothing exists in the legislative history or in the text of the 
Copyright Act that requires these two provisions to be read 
together in order to accomplish some overarching Congressional 
purpose.100
3. Never Said Never (Again) 
  Section 201 provides the process by which copyright 
ownership may be conveyed and § 203 provides for a statutory 
process to terminate that transfer right.  Once the copyright transfer 
has been effectively terminated, § 203 returns it to the author’s 
“bundle of sticks” to be transferred once again in a manner 
consistent with § 201, voluntarily in a time, place, and manner of 
the author’s choosing. 
One way to look at the copyright transfer by operation of law 
in a community property jurisdiction is that the initial transfer is 
the only initial transfer and all other divisions of the copyright are 
traceable back to that one initial transfer at the creation of the work 
to the marital estate.  If this is correct, then creation of the work 
commences the termination clock.  This would be a nightmare for 
all non-marital copyright transferees for whom the duration of the 
transfer rights would then be dependent on when the work was 
created during the marriage rather than the date the transfer takes 
place to that transferee. Alternatively, the initial transfer could be 
considered as taking place at the moment of creation to the marital 
community; however, any second or subsequent transfer at the 
moment of dissolution is a separate and independent act that would 
start a new termination of the transfer clock.  This latter position 
may be commended as one that promotes the equity in the property 
division at divorce, but it does not appear to be consistent with the 
modern understanding of community property and marital 
dissolution.  Dissolution is merely the allocation of property rights 
that are already vested in the marital community and not the 
                                                                                                             
99 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124–25 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5740. 
100 Id. at 124–28 (lacking any requirement that two provisions be read together). 
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creation of new non-marital property.  Nor would this answer the 
conundrum of termination of copyright transfers during the 
marriage or at any other point prior to the court order.101
III. AUTHOR’S TRANSFER OF COPYRIGHT 
 
The most problematic question regarding an author’s 
termination of transfer in the domestic relations context is whether 
a transfer of a copyright by operation of law to the marital estate as 
community property is a transfer that an author may terminate 
under § 203(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act. Under § 203(a), an 
author may only terminate a grant that the author has executed.102
                                                                                                             
101 The courts have not considered the effect of inter-spousal transfers of copyrights by 
operation of law in equitable distribution jurisdictions.  In jurisdictions where spouses 
own the copyrights as separate property, there is the potential that, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, the individually owned copyright may implicitly or explicitly become part 
of the property settlement.  If the author-spouse voluntarily agrees to the use of the 
copyright as an asset in the dissolution, then the transfer should take place at the effective 
date of the agreement under the same principles that would govern any other contractual 
copyright transfer.  The more interesting and under-theorized question that raises 
fascinating preemption issues is the de facto or implicit use of an author’s copyright to 
off-set some other property claim in the divorce.  If the right truly does belong solely to 
the author and is granted for constitutional copyright policy reasons rather than mere 
economic compensation, then using the copyright termination as a factor in allocating 
other marital property rights or assets may raise the specter of federal preemption.  
However other than to flag these issues as worthy of further study, they are outside the 
scope of this Article. 
  
This question requires some consideration of whether a transfer to 
the community property estate is one by operation of law that it is 
subject to termination by the author.  A downstream-related issue 
is that even if the copyrights are vested in the community property 
estate through operation of law, can the copyright rights 
subsequently then granted by the community property estate be 
terminated by exercise of the termination of the author’s transfer 
rights?  Finally, this Section will address the copyright termination 
status of copyright interests that were conveyed through prenuptial, 
postnuptial, property settlement agreements, or court orders. 
102 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2012). 
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A. By Prenuptial, Postnuptial, or Settlement Agreements 
Perhaps the easiest question presented in this Section is the 
author-spouse’s ability to terminate a transfer that is executed as 
part of a prenuptial, postnuptial, or settlement agreement.  A 
prenuptial, postnuptial, or settlement agreement is merely a 
contract of conveyance like any other assignment of copyright 
ownership or a grant of a lesser right such as a non-exclusive 
license.  There does not appear to be any provision in the 1976 
Copyright Act or its legislative history to indicate that the 
termination right should be treated differently depending on the 
motivation or the contractual consideration underlying the 
transfer.103  Terminating a prenuptial, postnuptial, or settlement 
agreement may become more problematic as the agreement may 
ultimately be merged into the divorce degree or other judicial 
order.104  Divorce law recognizes a difference between contracts 
regarding divorce settlements as a private contract, and a divorce 
settlement agreement that has become integrated into an order of 
the court.105
As a practical matter, if the jurisdiction followed the model 
established by the court in Worth, then either spouse is capable of 
transferring the copyright.
  However if the prenuptial, postnuptial, or settlement 
agreement has not become part of a court order, it remains merely 
a contract executed by the author and the transferred copyright is 
subject to termination by the author. 
106  However, as strange as it may seem 
to anyone versed in Copyright law, one would also suppose that 
Copyright law’s provisions regarding the termination of joint 
works of authorship would apply—unless the federal courts 
intervened and limited the statutory term author to mean only the 
creator of the original work.107
                                                                                                             
103 But see 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (resolving conflicting transfers). 
  Answering the conundrum of 
104 See, e.g., Molak v. Molak, 639 A.2d 57, 58 (R.I. 1994) (“A property-settlement 
agreement that is not merged into a final divorce decree retains the characteristics of an 
independent contract.”). 
105 See, e.g., id.; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. Rptr. 772, 773–75 (2d Dist. 1961); Jenkins v. 
Jenkins, 71 Pa. D. & C.4th 205, 222 (C.P. 2004). 
106 See supra Part I.A. 
107 In theory, a grant under California law by the non-author spouse would not be a 
grant executed by the author since it is one by operation of law.  The author is using the 
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putting the Worth decision into practice and the complexities of 
exercising these termination rights are well outside the scope of 
this Article.  For example, if the non-author-spouse is also deemed 
to be a legal author for the purposes of the termination of transfer 
rights then the termination of transfer rights for works of joint-
authorship is meaningless at least in this specific context. 
In the case of a grant executed by two or more 
authors of a joint work, termination of the grant 
may be effected by a majority of the authors who 
executed it; if any of such authors is dead, the 
termination interest of any such author may be 
exercised as a unit [by the widow(er), children, or 
grandchildren who] are entitled to exercise a total of 
more than one-half of that author’s interest.108
In order to exercise termination of transfer rights, it would take 
both spouses. If one spouse is deceased, it would take per stirpes a 
block of 51% of the author’s copyright interest to exercise the 
deceased spouse’s rights.  It would be simpler for the author-
spouse to terminate a transfer to the marital estate and then 
terminate all transfers that flow from ownership rights of the non-
author-spouse.  If this is not an option, then the statutory language 
that defines “joint-work” under the 1976 Copyright Act should be 
ignored and this anomalous situation should be treated by analogy 
as a joint-work with application of the termination of a transfer in a 
joint-work. 
 
Unlike the holding in Worth, the decision in Rodrigue more 
closely fits the classic pattern in termination cases.  As discussed 
earlier, in Rodrigue the court gave ownership and control of the § 
106 rights to the author-spouse.109
                                                                                                             
term jurisdiction rather than state because these disputes could potentially arise in Puerto 
Rico or the relevant marital relationship for non-U.S. authors or works could be from a 
foreign country. 
  Since all interests in copyrights 
subject to termination will derive from a grant of rights executed 
by the author-spouse, the author spouse may terminate them.  
However, the Rodrigue II court suggested that the author-spouse 
108 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1). 
109 See supra Part I.B. 
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had an independent state law duty to manage the copyright estate 
in a prudent manner.110  Further, the question of the status of the 
economic rights and whether they may be terminated separately 
from the § 106 grant of exclusive rights to the copyright owner is 
left unresolved.  The purpose of the termination of transfer rights is 
to permit the author, and the author’s statutory heirs, to recapture 
any residual economic value in the work.  If the economic right 
granted by the court in Rodrigue is analogous to a pension or an 
investment, then the spouse’s claim should survive even after the 
author purports to terminate the transfer.  However, if the spouse’s 
claim is merely that of any other assignee, then the spouse’s 
economic rights are also subject to termination along with the § 
106 exclusive rights.  Assuming that the Rodrigue court’s analysis 
is correct, the non-author-spouse’s continued claim would be a 
question of state law unless the 1976 Copyright Act’s termination 
of copyright transfer provisions and clear congressional intent 
would preempt a state law claim to economic rights post-
termination.111
B. By Operation of Law 
 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, authors may terminate 
copyright transfers that they executed.112  Copyrights may be 
transferred either by conveyance or by operation of law.113  The 
1976 Copyright Act does not expressly address terminating 
copyright transfers that take place by operation of law.114
                                                                                                             
110 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue (Rodrigue II), 218 F.3d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 2000). 
  The 
111 See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 382–83 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000). 
112 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). Section 203(a) provides that: 
In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the 
exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright 
or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after 
January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination 
under the following conditions . . . . 
113 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).  Section 201(d) provides that “[t]he ownership of a copyright 
may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of 
law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws 
of intestate succession.” 
114 Curiously, neither do the leading treatise authors. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 35; NIMMER, supra note 30; PATRY, supra note 7. 
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language of § 203(a) states “the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of 
a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, 
executed by the author . . . otherwise than by will, is subject to 
termination under the following condition . . . .”115  It is not clear 
whether a transfer by operation of law is subsumed under the 
phrase “executed by the author” for the purposes of a copyright 
termination of transfer.  When interpreting the 1976 Copyright 
Act, courts start with the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
statutory text.116  If the statutory text is ambiguous then courts will 
resort to extrinsic tools of statutory interpretation such as 
legislative history in order to divine Congress’s intent.117
In general, there are two points at which a copyright may be 
transferred.  First, the initial transfer from the author-creator and 
second, the transfer of an ownership interest by a subsequent 
owner deriving his or her rights in the copyright from a grant by 
the author.  The author’s right to an initial voluntary transfer 
appears to be almost inviolable.  Section 201(e) of the 1976 
Copyright Act provides that: 
 
When an individual author’s ownership of a 
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a 
copyright, has not previously been transferred 
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by 
any governmental body or other official or 
organization purporting to seize, expropriate, 
transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with 
respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive 
rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under 
this title, except as provided under title 11. 
Consequently, with the sole exception of those copyright 
interests transferred as part of an involuntary bankruptcy 
proceeding,118
                                                                                                             
115 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 initially all copyright rights must be derived directly 
from the author and must be transferred voluntarily.  Section 
201(d)(1) and § 204(a) provide for a transfer of copyright “by 
116 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989). 
117 Id. at 743. 
118 17 U.S.C. § 201(e). 
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operation of law.”119  However, operation of law has been so far 
“limited to judicial actions such as bankruptcy actions, mortgage 
foreclosures, IRS liens, and divorce decrees.”120  This 
interpretation is clearly consistent with the limited number of 
situations such as bankruptcy (expressly allowed under §201(e)), 
lien and mortgage foreclosures, bequests, consent judgments, and 
“perhaps community property law or marital divisions” have the 
necessary overt acts by the author in order for a court to sometimes 
find an implicit consent to the transfer of a copyright by operation 
of law.121  The involuntary initial transfer of the copyright would 
be permissible solely through involuntary bankruptcy 
proceedings.122  In this case, there would be a clear date when the 
copyright entered the bankruptcy estate and was then sold or 
transferred to meet the claims of the author-spouse’s debtors.  
Considering the purposes behind the termination of transfer right, 
there appears to be no reason why a transfer through a bankruptcy 
proceeding cannot be terminated under the usual provisions of § 
203(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act approximately 35 years after the 
initial transfer.  Also, a prior voluntary transfer of a copyright that 
is now part of a bankruptcy estate and is otherwise eligible for 
termination of the initial transfer could also be terminated under 
the provisions of § 203(a) because the bankruptcy code does not 
trump the 1976 Copyright Act.123
Courts often look to patent law by analogy in copyright 
cases.
 
124  However, Patent law is readily distinguishable from 
Copyright law when considering probate transfers because state 
probate law, rather than a specific provision in federal Patent law, 
determines subsequent patent ownership.125
                                                                                                             
119 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d)(1) (citing “any means of conveyance or by operation of law” 
and also including the applicable laws of intestate succession), 204(a) (invalidating, 
under specific circumstances, a transfer of copyright unless by operation of law). 
  More importantly, the 
120 See 2 PATRY, supra note 6, § 5:138 n.2. 
121 See id. at § 5:116. 
122 17 U.S.C. § 201(e). 
123 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
124 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984). 
125 See Akazawa v. New Link Techs. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
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1952 Patent Act does not contain a provision analogous to the 
Copyright Act’s formalities and limitations on transfers of owner 
right ownership, including “by operation of law,”126 nor has 
Congress seen fit to change this in the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (“AIA”), the most recent major revision of U.S. Patent 
law.127  The closest analogous provision in Patent law is 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1) which provides that “[e]very patent shall contain a 
short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or 
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling the invention . . . ”128  The case law in the 
Federal Circuit regarding assignments of patents by operation of 
law, have largely focused on various forms of post-mortem 
succession to the patent rights.129  To the limited degree that Patent 
law is useful in interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act, express 
assignment provisions under 35 U.S.C. § 261 are not exclusive and 
Patent law only though judicial gloss recognizes “by operation of 
law” as an alternative method of conveying a patent and one that is 
not covered by the express patent law requirement of a writing.130
Recognizing the ambiguous nature of the statutory language of 
the 1976 Copyright Act, this Article will assume that, other than in 
the case of bankruptcy, any initial transfer of copyright ownership 
by an author must be voluntary and because it was voluntary, it 
was a de facto transfer executed by the author, and such a transfer 
is eligible for the author-spouse to terminate it by operation of law.  
This Article will continue with its analysis of termination of 
transfer rights in the domestic relations context, under this 
assumption.  However, if the author may not terminate a transfer 
by operation of law, this would limit the author’s potential rights 
solely to subsequent transfers by the marital community or to 
prenuptial, postnuptial, or settlement agreements.  Even more 
 
                                                                                                             
126 See Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
127 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
128 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
129 See, e.g., Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356; H.M. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). But see Sky Techs., 576 F.3d. at 1381 (noting state foreclosure and by 
operation of law assignment of a patent). 
130 See Shoshana Lavinghouse, Survey, Sky Technologies, LLC v. Sap AG, 576 F.3d 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 85, 86 (2009). 
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narrowly, the author may not be able to terminate subsequent 
transfers by the marital estate either because, in theory, in a 
community property state such as California, the author-spouse 
was not executing these documents in his or her capacity as author.  
Rather, the author executed the transfer in his or her capacity as a 
representative of the marital estate because the author no longer 
owned the copyright, but it became instead the property of the 
marital estate under state law.  The logic is that if an author cannot 
terminate upstream transfers, then the author also could not be able 
to terminate downstream transfers of an interest in a copyright.  
Such an interpretation of Copyright law or state law would 
severely burden any exercise of the author’s termination of transfer 
right and, in effect, neuter the author’s exercise of the right in 
community property states that may follow the court’s holding in 
Worth. 
C. Judicial Decrees 
Prenuptial, postnuptial, and marital property settlement 
agreements are merely ordinary contracts unless merged into a 
decree of divorce.  “They are treated by courts in the same manner 
as ordinary contracts, governed by contract law, and subject to the 
principles of contract law.” 131  The nature of these agreements 
changes when they are merged into a divorce decree, from one of 
ordinary contract to an order of the court having the force of 
law.132  Regardless of what a state court may decree as part of the 
property settlement in a marital dissolution proceeding allocating 
interests in the copyright, Congress has vested solely in the author-
spouse, his or her widow(er), and his or her children, the ultimate 
right to terminate a copyright transfer.133
                                                                                                             
131 See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife §§ 89, 101 (2012) (citing Rider v. Rider, 669 
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996); In re Marriage of Conner, 713 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); 
In re Marriage of Van Regenmorter, 587 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); Holz v. 
Holz, 2004 PA Super 181, 850 A.2d 751 (2004)); see also UNIF. PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT ACT § 9, 9C U.LA. 53 (2001). 
  One of the rights of an 
author under copyright law is the right to terminate the transfer of 
132 See James T. Tucker, Annotation, Family Court Jurisdiction to Hear Contract 
Claims, 46 A.L.R. 5th 735 §§ 8–9 (1997). 
133 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
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copyright ownership, including lesser non-ownership rights such as 
a non-exclusive license.134  Importantly, for this analysis of 
preemption, “[t]ermination of the grant may be effected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an 
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.”135  If the 
author-spouse, through the voluntary act of marriage (or 
domiciling) in a community property state, is presumed to have 
granted an interest in the copyright through the operation of state 
law, then the author-spouse may terminate that transfer under 17 
U.S.C. § 203 with not less than two and nor more than five years’ 
notice, approximately thirty-five years after the initial transfer.136  
Further, if the copyright term is extended, Congress has so far 
provided additional opportunities to terminate the transfer in the 
extended copyright term.137
A related section of the 1976 Copyright Act, § 203(b)(5) at first 
blush may superficially limit the application of § 203(a)(5).  
Section 203(b)(5) provides that “[t]ermination of a grant under this 
section affects only those rights covered by the grants that arise 
under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under any other 
Federal, State, or foreign laws.”
 
138
Nothing contained in this section or elsewhere in 
this legislation is intended to extend any license or 
transfer made for a period of less than thirty-five 
years.  Likewise nothing in this section or 
legislation is intended to change the existing state of 
the law of contracts concerning the circumstances in 
which an author may terminate a license, transfer or 
assignment.  Section 203(b)(6) provides that unless 
  Yet, the legislative history 
clearly states: 
                                                                                                             
134 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
135 Id. § 203(a)(5); see also id. § 304(c)(5) (pre-1978 works). See generally 7 PATRY, 
supra note 7, § 25:74 & nn.5–6 
136 Of course, if state law, Copyright law, or the agreement permits it then the rights 
may be terminated prior to the thirty-five year period. See Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 
483 (7th Cir.); cf. Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc. 182 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999). But 
see Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 1993). 
137 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(d); 3 PATRY, supra note 8, § 7:62. 
138 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(5). 
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and until termination is effected under this section, 
the grant, ‘if it does not provide otherwise,’ 
continues for the term of copyright.  The quoted 
language means that the agreement does not provide 
for a term of less than thirty-five years.139
So, § 203(b)(5) would not provide for an independent state law 
exception in the case of marital dissolution proceedings or 
community property states to the author’s termination rights. 
 
D. Marriage Equality 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the question of who is an 
eligible widow(er) is determined in reference to state law.  Section 
101 of the Act defines an author’s “widow” or “widower” as the 
“author’s surviving spouse under the law of the author’s domicile 
at the time of his or her death, whether or not the spouse has later 
remarried.”140  The progress of marriage equality has added one 
more conundrum to the dubious policy of Congress permitting 
state law to define federal rights.  A copyright is a federal right, 
and arguably under the ambit of the United States v. Windsor 
ruling.141  Prior to Windsor, as a matter of federal law Congress 
expressly excluded a same-sex partner from being a statutory heir 
for the exercise of Copyright law’s termination of transfer rights, 
even if the same-sex couple was legally married under the laws of 
their state.142  The Supreme Court has since held that Congress’s 
definition of a marriage as only that between a man and a woman 
was unconstitutional.143
                                                                                                             
139 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 18–19 (1975). 
  By defining marriage according to the 
laws of the state where the couple is domiciled at the time of death, 
Copyright law’s definition of a widow/widower inadvertently adds 
another confounding variable to the termination of transfer rights 
conundrum.  Arguably, unless the courts or Congress acts, in the 
case of a same-sex couple married in one state legally, but who are 
domiciled in a state with a so-called Defense Of Marriage Act 
statute or equivalent state constitutional provision, at the time of 
140 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
141 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
142 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
143 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680. 
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the author’s death, the same-sex surviving spouse will not enjoy 
the rights of a widow(er) under the Copyright Act (and the author’s 
eligible statutory heirs would enjoy these rights). 
E. International Complexities 
Termination of copyright transfer rights under § 203(a) of the 
1975 Copyright Act are not limited to United States authors or 
United States works.144  Rather, U.S. Copyright law applies to all 
works protected by copyright in the United States regardless of 
their copyright status or ownership in their country of origin.  
Copyright law is territorial so foreign authors and the authors of 
non-U.S. works may terminate copyright transfers of rights to 
exploit works in the United States.  Whatever rights an author or 
copyright owner may enjoy under Copyright law are solely based 
on the domestic law of the jurisdiction in which the author or 
copyright owner is asserting copyrights.145  The complexities that 
are discussed above apply in equal or greater force when the work 
is not a United States work under the Berne Convention or the 
author is not a United State author.  One may speculate that a U.S. 
court would find a voluntary transfer of the U.S. copyright by 
operation of the foreign law when a marriage takes place or during 
residence in a foreign country with laws and analogous conditions 
to those in U.S. community property states and results in a 
voluntary transfer of copyright to the marital estate under the laws 
of the foreign country.146  So that even if the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the author lived—or other jurisdiction where there was a 
copyright transfer—did not provide for a termination of transfer 
right, the author could terminate copyright transfers in the United 
States.147
                                                                                                             
144 See id. (defining “United States work”).  The definition of widow or widower is 
consistent with this interpretation.  The definition is not tied to a state or even the United 
States. 
  Presumably such a transfer of rights in the United States 
145 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(3), 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter BERNE CONVENTION]; Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney 
Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996). See generally 7 PATRY, supra note 7, § 25:18. 
146 If this was not true then § 201(e) of the 1976 Copyright Act, addressing Involuntary 
Transfers, is totally redundant. 
147 See 7 PATRY, supra note 7, § 25:74 (discussing copyright reversion rights). 
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may be terminated under the same terms and conditions discussed 
in this Article.148  And of course, the converse is equally true.  
Section 203(a) does not permit the termination of a transfer of 
foreign (non-US) rights by either as U.S. author, the non-U.S. 
author of a U.S. work, or a foreign author of a non-U.S. work.149
IV. STATE LAW BASED INTERESTS IN TERMINATION OF TRANSFER 
RIGHTS 
 
Having tied up the bundle of sticks relating to the marital 
community’s interest under state law in the copyrighted works 
created during the marriage, there remains the question of whether 
state law could purport to grant any interest in the termination right 
itself.150
                                                                                                             
148 See generally BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 
  Solely for the sake of this discussion, this Article will 
assume that federal law would not preempt any state law or 
judicial decree attempting to transfer the termination of transfer 
right from the author or the author’s statutory heirs or to limit the 
145, art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, 
in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of 
the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now 
or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this 
Convention.”); id art. 5(3) (“Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic 
law.  However, when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for 
which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same 
rights as national authors.”); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“Each 
Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual 
property . . . .”). 
149 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(5) (2012) (“[I]n no way affects rights under . . . foreign laws”); 
see also 7 PATRY, supra note 7, § 25:74.  Of course, this is the flip side of the community 
property copyright conundrum when U.S. state law transfers an interest in a copyrighted 
work, but the domestic laws of the foreign country does not recognize that transfer.  As a 
practical matter during the marriage, this point is moot in the U.S. because under state 
community property law, the income from the foreign exploitation of the copyright is 
community property.  It may also be a moot point because community property is the 
most prevalent form of marital property ownership globally so that the community 
property interest in the copyright under foreign laws may be similar to the community 
property interests in U.S. community property states. 
150 Ivan Hoffman, Are Copyrights Community Property?, http://www.ivanhoffman
.com/cp.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2013). 
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author’s exercise of the termination right.  This would then lead to 
the question of the legal status of the termination right as a form of 
property right under state law.  In community property states, there 
are two major categories of property rights under which the 
copyright termination right could fall.  It could be characterized as 
either an “expectancy” or as a “contingent interest” in property.151  
There do not appear to be any copyright cases directly on point.  
The 1909 Copyright Act’s roughly analogous provision (to the 
1976 Copyright Act’s termination of copyright transfer provision) 
which provided the author with a renewal period in which a new 
copyright estate was created and was not burdened by prior grants 
of copyright, unless the author survived into the renewal period, is 
a useful place to start.  Under the 1909 Copyright Act, the courts 
described the “property” interests in the renewal right as a mere 
expectancy.152  However, while the federal courts consistently 
described the 1909 Act’s renewal right as an “expectancy,” it is 
clear from the operational language used in opinions that the actual 
legal interests in copyright renewal rights were, in substance, 
contingent property rights under state law, so the renewal rights in 
the second copyright term were vested in the marital community 
under state law.153
The most analogous body of law to a termination of transfer 
right is probably found outside intellectual property law and in the 
line of cases considering state law rights to federal pension benefits 
in community property states because pension benefits, like 
termination of copyrights, have an inherent period before the right 
is vested; and because Congress has established by statute eligible 
classes of claimants in the case of some beneficiaries for pension 
benefits, like termination of transfer rights.  In the case of In re 
Marriage of Brown, the California Supreme Court considered 
 
                                                                                                             
151 See In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 562–63 (Cal. 1976); Shill v. Shill, 115 
Idaho 115, 124 (1988); Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 411 (1978); Ewing v. 
Ewing, 739 S.W.2d 470, 472–73 (Tex. App. 1987). 
152 See David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating 
Worth, 36 UCLA L. REV. 383, 391–92 (1988) (citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. 
Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960); Tobias v. Joy Music, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 556 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rose v. Bourne, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d, 279 
F.2d 79 (2d Cir.)). 
153 See Nimmer, supra note 152. 
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whether a spouse was entitled to a share of a pension in which the 
pension rights had not yet vested.154
The term expectancy describes the interest of a 
person who merely foresees that he might receive a 
future beneficence, such as the interest of an heir 
apparent or of a beneficiary designated by a living 
insured who has a right to change the beneficiary.  
As these examples demonstrate, the defining 
characteristic of an expectancy is that its holder has 
no enforceable right to his beneficence.
  The Brown court had to 
distinguish between an expectancy in which the marital community 
had no rights (and was therefore the sole property of one spouse) 
and a contingent interest in community property (a property 
interest that the spouses owned in common): 
155
The court would later opine that if there is a contractual right to 
be named the beneficiary of a policy, then the beneficiary no 
longer has a mere expectancy but rather a property right.
 
156
However, any state-law based property claim by a non-author 
spouse (except as the surviving widow or widower) to exercise the 
termination of transfer right as a contingent interest should be 
clearly and expressly preempted.  The two cases finding that state 
community property law was not preempted were able to do so 
with dexterous readings of the 1976 Copyright Act.  However, 
even these two cases acknowledged that if there was a conflict 
between state domestic relations law and federal copyright law, 
federal law would control.
  This 
would suggest that under California law, not only was the right to 
the copyright transferred by operation of law, but also the right to 
the termination of that transfer—or perhaps at least the economic 
value of the termination right—was also transferred by operation 
of state law assuming, arguendo, federal law would permit such a 
transfer. 
157
                                                                                                             
154 Brown, 544 P.2d at 563. 
  Unlike the status of copyright 
155 Id. at 565 (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Nimmer, supra note 
152, at 391–92. 
156 Brown, 544 P.2d at 566. 
157 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
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ownership in community property states, in the case of termination 
of transfer rights, Congress has not been silent.  Congress has 
clearly and unambiguously granted the copyright transfer 
termination rights to the author and the author’s statutory heirs, 
specifically the author’s widow(er) and children.158  The specific 
scope of this express grant of rights does not appear to leave open 
a principled opportunity for the courts to provide additional 
protections to a divorced spouse through the operation of state 
domestic relations law or the state’s characterization of the 
termination of transfer right as a contingent interest that is a 
property right of the marital community under state law.  Rather, 
the termination right is solely a right for the author or the author’s 
statutory heirs.159
V. STATE COURT CONTEMPT POWER AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
 
Although a state court may not directly have the power to stop 
the termination of a copyright transfer or even reverse a 
termination of transfer, a state court may attempt to order the 
author or the author’s statutory heirs not to exercise the author’s 
termination right; to transfer for the benefits of the termination to a 
divorced spouse; or to impose on the author or subsequent 
transferees some form of constructive trust for the benefit of the 
non-author-spouse.160 State courts, through contempt proceedings, 
have attempted to force recipients of federal benefits to comply 
with state court orders transferring federal rights that the state court 
could not directly transfer.161
Contempt power has been uniformly held to be 
necessary to the protection of the court from insults 
and oppressions while in the ordinary course of its 
duties, and to enable it to enforce its judgments and 
 
                                                                                                             
158 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2013). 
159 See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583 (1979). 
160 See H.A.W., Annotation, Jurisdiction of state court to enforce or control 
performance by Federal officer or employee of duties imposed upon him by a Federal 
statute, 138 A.L.R. 1200 (1942). 
161 See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 621–22 (1987). 
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orders necessary to the due administration of law 
and the protection of the rights of suitor.162
Therefore, courts have used their contempt powers to enforce 
judicial orders of all types, and a court’s use of its contempt 
powers in a civil domestic relations matter is not uncommon.
 
163
But, the scope of judicial orders and the powers of state court 
judges are limited by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution;
 
164 
so the state court’s ability to enforce a decree dividing marital 
assets is limited under federal preemption principles.  The scope of 
a court’s contempt power is not unlimited.  A court may only use 
its contempt power to enforce a legally cognizable right.165
Section 203(a) is not part of the 1976 Copyright Act’s express 
preemption scheme.
  So, if 
the underlying law (or court order) is invalid under the 
Constitution or by constitutionally based principles of preemption, 
then author or the person(s) possessing the termination of transfer 
rights disobeying the order is not in contempt of court.  This 
Section will analyze whether a state court could interfere with an 
author’s exercise of his or her unfettered right to terminate a 
copyright transfer, if the exercise of such a termination right 
contrary to a court order in a domestic relations case is legally 
contemptuous or whether federal law would preempt the 
enforcement of such an order. 
166
                                                                                                             
162 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987) 
(quoting Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 333 (1904) (emphasis supplied by 
the Court in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  However, even without an express federal 
163 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (recognizing the power 
of contempt is “inherent in all courts”). 
164 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
165 See, e.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 800. 
166 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to 
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come 
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, . . . are 
governed exclusively by this title.  Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or 
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”).  
There is a strong argument that state limitations on an author’s ability to recapture § 103 
or § 106 rights may be comparable granting equivalent rights, and thus expressly 
preempted. 
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law preempting state laws, courts may find that a state law is 
preempted, if either the state law conflicts with federal law or if 
Congress intended federal law to occupy the field and to displace 
all state regulation.167  In conflict or field preemption cases, federal 
law preempts state law if either it is impossible to comply with 
both state and federal law or if the state law frustrates “the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”168  If the conflict is in an area that is usually subject 
to state regulation, then federal courts will not preempt the 
challenged state law unless “[it] was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress” to preempt state regulation.169  Moreover, 
courts use a canon of statutory construction—that is, courts should 
ordinarily prefer a plausible interpretation of state or federal law 
that avoids preempting state law.170
Section 203(a) potentially falls within the ambit of a state 
family-property law conflict; therefore, the conflict must “do 
‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before 
the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be 
overridden.”
 
171  However, this is by no means an insurmountable 
standard. In almost all of recent community property cases, the 
Court has held that federal law preempted the challenged state 
laws.172  This practical lesson from recent Supreme Court cases 
suggests the Court actually gives little practical deference to state 
court decisions and state laws concerning family law regarding the 
allocation of federal rights or benefits.173
                                                                                                             
167 See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000). 
 
168 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
169 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
170 Altria Group, 555 U.S. at 77. 
171 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting United States v. 
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). 
172 Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 582 (“[O]n at least four prior occasions this Court has found 
it necessary to forestall such an injury to federal rights by state law based on community 
property concepts.”).  Hisquierdo became the fifth such case; Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 
U.S. 46 (1981), the sixth case; and Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 
(2001), the seventh case.  But see Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987). 
173 See Gibbons, supra note 32, at 139 n.156 (citing Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 156–61 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 591 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
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The starting place for any preemption analysis of a federal 
statute is the language of the statute and the intent of Congress.174
(a) Conditions for Termination. — In the 
case of any work other than a work made for hire, 
the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or 
license of copyright or of any right under a 
copyright, executed by the author on or after 
January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject 
to termination under the following conditions: 
  
The relevant operational language of § 203(a) provides: 
(1) In the case of a grant executed by one 
author, termination of the grant may be effected by 
that author or, if the author is dead, by the person or 
persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, 
own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than 
one-half of that author’s termination interest. [The 
rights in clause (2) are vested in the widow(er), 
surviving children, grandchildren, and in the event 
that these statutory heirs are not still living, the 
executor, personal representative, or trustee may 
exercise the author’s termination rights.]175
[ . . . ] 
 
  (5) Termination of the grant may be effected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, 
including an agreement to make a will or to make 
any future grant.176
Courts also look to the intent and purpose of the legislation.
 
177  
The legislative history behind § 203(a) is clear; it is to permit 
authors to recapture unrenumerative transfers and to provide for 
the economic security of the spouse, children, and grandchildren of 
the author.178
                                                                                                             
174 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996). 
  One may assume that Congress wished to privilege 
175 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
176 Id. § 203(a)(5). 
177 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743–44 (1989) 
(looking at the legislative history of the Copyright Act). 
178 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124–25 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5740. 
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the author first so as to promote the creation of new works and 
then reward the natural objects of the author’s bounty, the spouse 
and progeny.  However, it is not clear that Congress ever explicitly 
considered competing spouses.  Children from any relationship are 
clearly protected at least insofar as they survive the author, but 
only the lawful spouse, at the author’s death, is entitled to be a 
statutory heir under the 1976 Copyright Act.179
CONCLUSION 
  One may assume 
from this limitation as to who may claim rights from the author 
that Congress as a matter of policy granted a statutory preference 
to the last in time spouse over the earlier divorced spouse.  
Perhaps, there is an unstated assumption that promoting a 
harmonious current marital relationship is more conducive to the 
“Progress of Science and the Useful Arts” than a more equitable 
allocation of economic interests in the copyright. 
Whatever rights to a copyright the divorced spouse may claim 
under state law, federal law is clear that the termination right may 
be exercised only by the author, the author’s widow, the author’s 
statutory heirs under the 1976 Copyright Act, or, if there are no 
surviving statutory heirs, the author’s executor of the author’s 
estate180 by providing the transferee with appropriate notice 
complying with the Copyright Act’s statutory formalities.181  The 
author’s ability to exercise termination of transfer rights presents 
numerous problems in the allocating of copyrights (and other 
assets) in a divorce preceding.  First, regardless of the status of the 
copyright under state law as marital property, whatever state courts 
order as part of a divorce proceeding, or even if the divorce 
settlement is voluntary, the author-spouse has an unwaivable 
federal right to terminate the transfer of the copyright.182
                                                                                                             
179 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
  Second, 
regardless of the intent of the author-spouse or the courts, if the 
180 Id. 
181 Id. § 203(a)(4). But see In re Marriage of Larson, No. B192070, 2008 WL 223722 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008). 
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5); N & D E Co., Inc. v. Gustings, Civ. A. No. 90–4445, 
1992 WL 77581, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1992). 
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author does not survive into the period in which he or she may 
elect to terminate the transfer, the termination right statutorily vests 
in the author’s then-widow(er) and children (per stirpes) and not in 
the divorced spouse.183  Under Copyright law, it is the widow(er) 
or children who may exercise these rights.184  State laws seem to 
preclude a divorced spouse from the privileges of 
widow(er)hood.185  The divorced spouse may not exercise the 
termination of transfer rights nor prevent the statutory heirs from 
exercising their termination of transfer rights.  Therefore, even if 
by operation of law, a copyright becomes part of the community 
property estate, it will remain there only at the sufferance of the 
author-spouse or the author’s statutory heirs, and a state court’s 
ability to manage the copyright assets, as part of the divorce 
proceeding is extremely limited.186 Consequently, this is an area of 
the 1976 Copyright Act that is ripe for the Congress or the federal 
courts to establish uniform law before the state courts or 
legislatures in exercise of their traditional powers to regulate 
domestic relations act to create a further non-uniform body of 
Copyright law in the context of domestic relations.187
                                                                                                             
183 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 771 (6th Cir. 
2005); Troutman v. Estate of Troutman, 937 N.E.2d 173, 177 (Ohio App. 2010). 
 
184 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
185 See, e.g., In re McCarthy’s Estate, 73 P.2d 910 (Cal. App. 1937); Opdahl v. 
Johnson, 28 N.E.2d 308 (Ill. App. 1940); In re Chomsky’s Estate, 101 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sur. 
1950); see also 2 ABRAMS, supra note 86, § 12:21; Nevins, supra note 30, at 510–12. 
186 See supra Part III.B–C. 
187 Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059 (2013) 
